Ustrojstvo i djelovanje “hibridnog predsjedništva” – Ocjena djelovanja diobe vlasti unutar hrvatske izvršne vlasti by Branko Smerdel
Zbornik PFZ, 65, (2) 181-211 (2015) 181
DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE “HYBRID” 
PRESIDENCY – EVALUATION OF THE POWER 
SHARING IN THE CROATIAN TOP EXECUTIVE1
Prof. Dr. Branko Smerdel *     UDK: 342.6(497.5)
                 342.591.01(497.5)
      Izvorni znanstveni rad
      Primljeno: travanj 2015.
Constitutional experimentation with the organization of government in Croa-
tia has not been completed in the twenty five years of independence. The discussion 
is ongoing and has been revived with each presidential elections. It is not limited 
exclusively to the academic community; the important political leaders, as usual, 
reopened the discussion during the presidential electoral campaign of 2014/2015. 
The previous discussions, often with the aim of examining the public opinion 
had, generally speaking, been disguised under the pretext of demanding “a pure 
parliamentary system”, as if the “hybrid” character of the constitutional system 
per se had created problems. Those arguments were scientifically rather easy to 
dismiss, since there has been virtually no “pure system” functioning in practice. 
The recent contention, however, puts an emphasis on the necessity to establish a 
more efficient government which would be energetic enough to deal with the serious 
and prolonged economic, social and political crisis. The analysis of this makes the 
primary purpose of this paper, departing from the question whether the time has 
come to amend the Constitution and to abandon the particular arrangement of 
checks and balances developed during the Constitutional reform of the year 2000, 
the primary objective of which has been to prevent a reoccurrence of the system 
of personalized and concentrated power, as developed during the first decade of 
independence under the pretext of the French model of a semi-presidential system. 
* Branko Smerdel, Ph. D., Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Trg mar-
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1 This paper makes a part of the research report for the Research Program of the 
University of Zagreb Law Faculty research project: Constitutional developments 
since the accession to the European Union, section The Executive, Finalized on 
March 30, 2015.
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It is not our intention to analyze anew whether that might be “a pure semi-pre-
sidential system”, nor “a pure parliamentary system” or a real cohabitation à 
la française.2 Rather, ours is the aim to provide an overview of and evaluate the 
actual functioning of the specific Croatian variation of “a two-headed executive”, 
as well as whether the expectations from it have been fulfilled. The question we 
pose is a crucial one: has the young Croatian republic achieved such a level of 
democratic development and the rule of law that the checks might be forgotten 
and the full authority be confined to the Government in order to strengthen its’ 
economic and reformist capacities, or do we still believe that the necessary checks 
should be maintained? Instead of a proposal for change, we conclude with a ca-
veat: do not undertake substantial changes of the system without a solid scientific 
projection of possible consequences. 
Keywords: Croatia, President of the Republic, Constitution, pure parlamen-
tarism, crisis, “hybrid” presidency
‘A good principle not rightly understood, may prove as hurtful as 
a bad one.’ 
 John Milton 
‘To make use from the past experience, democracy has already to 
achieve a certain level of civilization and enlightening.’   
 Alexis de Tocqueville
‘Than none was for the party, than all were for the state, 
The Romans lived like brothers, in the brave days of old’
 Thomas Maculay
2 As it had been asserted by Aarend Lijphart in his influential article Constitutional 
Choices for New Democracies, Journal of Democracy, Vol. I, No. 2, 1990, pp. 42 – 48. 
Among the immense body of literature cf. a recent summary in Podolnjak, Robert: 
Utjecaj francuskog polupredsjedničkog sustava na oblikovanje ustavnog položaja predsjednika 
Republike u post-komunističkim državama: Hrvatska u komparativnoj perspektivi, in Bačić, 
Arsen (ed.): Foreign Influences and the Croatian Responses, HAZU, Zagreb, 2012.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of governmental organization is not a simple or an easy one.3 
Moreover, the majority of politicians and their accompanying experts might 
be wrong when commending a concentration of power in order to confront the 
crisis and unemployment.4 The question, and we limit ourselves to our coun-
try, must be based on the analysis of the social environment of the country. 
The government must be efficient, but it must not be left without any control 
mechanisms. There exist countries where the process “of democratic transiti-
on” has not produced a responsible political community. It certainly has to do 
with the crisis of responsibility in the model countries.5 
The executive, or the deciding authority, makes the very center of go-
vernmental power.6 The engineering business, or the design of the constitu-
tional institutions, seeks a balance between the contradictory demands: an 
energetic but responsible government. While in certain societies and in cer-
tain periods of time, such demands sound like absurd theoretical exercises, 
in others they might be judged as relatively satisfied.7 In Croatia, the idea of 
3 Even after the resignation of the President due to the Watergate affair, Theodore 
Sorensen warned: “The problem with checking the executive power arises because the 
power to cause a great damage in the same time means the authority to do a lot of 
good things!” Sorensen, Theodore C.: A Different Kind of Presidency, Wiley & Sons, New 
York, 1984, p. 23. It would be difficult to find out who was the first to compare it to 
the problems of quadratura circuli, respective a cubatio spherae, which had been a concern 
of medieval mathematicians. Late in his life even Thomas Hobbes entered into disputes 
about those with the Oxford dons. After a long period of the ideological propaganda of 
the unity of power and the assembly rule, the issue was opened in Croatia on the eve of 
regime change. See Introduction in Sokol, Smiljko; Smerdel, Branko: Organizacija vlasti, 
Narodne novine, Zagreb, 1988. In Slovenia, the question was opened even earlier, cf. 
Bučar, France: Da li nam je potrebna vlada?, Moderna organizacija, Vol. 1, 1971.   
4 Even the European Union might be wrong in praising the system of decision ma-
king which, ignoring the Lisbon Agreement, puts all the trust into the one political 
leader. This certainly is a caveat against accepting foreign recommandations uncri-
tically.
5 Woodhouse, Diana: Ministers and Parliament. Accountability in Thoery and Practice, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998.
6 The misguiding vocabulary of politics would be better replaced with the more accu-
rate one: there exists a ‘deciding power’ and the ‘control power’ (if any). Gaudemet, 
Paul M.: Le pouvoir exécutif aux les pays occidentaux, Éditions Montchrestien, Paris, 
1966.
7 Dahrendorf, Ralph: Reflection on the Revolution in Europe, Random House, London, 
1990, p. 115. V. also Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transiti-
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institutionalization of governmental institutions, is taking roots rather slowly 
and reluctantly. 
One of the substantive elements of the constitution is the idea of ensu-
ring sustainable development of legal, political and social relations towards 
democracy and the rule of law. The constitution is regarded as a great strategic 
plan which should gradually be implemented. The power chart so defined is 
expected to influence the further development of a political process within a 
political community.
The common truism has it that constitutions come into existence at the 
“constitutional moments” and that the fundamental constitutional choices are 
made by the people. However, such moments often arise after a violent regime 
replacement, often under control of not so democratically oriented leaders, 
and eventually bring various forms of practical autocracy. In other cases the 
truly democratic solutions are sought. To this kind we owe the survival of 
a dream of the constitutional revolution: social and political reconstruction 
effected by legal instrumentality.8 
The result of a constitutional moment might be a legal document, basic 
law, i.e. the constitution. Its drafters express the ideas of political leaders and 
their supporters at home and internationally (the great powers or as usually 
called today, “the international community”), expecting the document to pro-
duce certain results.9
But, as the American Founding Fathers warned, “the words on paper and 
‘the parchment barriers’, would not enforce themselves”, and should not be 
expected to do so. They might, but do not have to be the instruments of the 
enlightened people nor does their political leadership have to be committed 
to a democratic development. They are declared to be a mighty instrument of 
using political power for good purposes, as defined by the constitution. There 
could have been a high consensus about expectations, but the results that 
on and Consolidation, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 
1996, pp. 55 – 65; Sajo, Andrasz: Limiting Government, An Introduction to Constitutio-
nalism, CEU Press, Budapest, 1999, pp. 69 – 103.
8 Smerdel, Branko: Central European Democratic Transition: The Paradigm of a Constitu-
tional Revolution, in Fleiner Basta, L.; Marinković, Tanasije (eds.): Key Developments 
in Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, Eleven international publishing, The Ha-
gue, 2014, pp. 51 – 63.
9 Smerdel, Branko: Teorija o ustavnopravnom inženjerstvu i njezin utjecaj na izgradnju de-
mokratskih ustavnopravnih institucija Republike Hrvatske, in Bačić, Arsen (ed.): Ustavi i 
demokracija – strani utjecaji i domaći odgovori, HAZU, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 71 – 104.
Zbornik PFZ, 65, (2) 181-211 (2015) 185
followed have always been far from certain. What follows the adoption of a 
constitution too often takes an unexpected direction. The process of imple-
mentation consists of a number of decisions on lower levels, from the legisla-
ture to the independent judiciary.  
While the creation of a constitution is often compared to architecture, the 
implementation could be considered as engineering. The final constructions 
too often do not operate according to the designers’ expectations. In particu-
lar, this is true for experiments with political institutions and concepts.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE, CONSTRUCTION AND BRICKWORK OF 
THE CONSTITUTION
1. The selection of a proper constitutional model
Constitutional choice could be defined as a process of collective decision-
making at the largest possible scale, by which peoples and nations select their 
basic political commitments and political institutions by which they are to 
govern their affairs. This definition, thus, assumes that the selection between 
available alternatives needs to have a strong scientific foundation if a democra-
tic rule upon the principles of the rule of law is the true aim of the constitution 
makers. The constitution of a tyranny or an autocracy cannot thus be conside-
red a constitution in the proper sense. Giovanni Sartori warns: “To be sure (it 
should go without saying) constitutions are a plan or frame for free government. 
As a manner of speech we have fallen into a careless habit of calling any and 
all state forms constitutions. As a matter of correct understanding it should be 
understood, however, that for constitutionalism ... constitutions are only the 
state forms in which (as Rousseau said) we are free because we are governed 
by laws and not by other men.”10
If and when agreed that the aim, or a telos of the process, is to establish an 
effective but responsible government, the certain principles established du-
ring the centuries of human experience with government could be regarded 
as guiding. On that, V. Ostrom writes: “Constitutional choice establishes the 
authority and limitations on that authority that is intended to apply to those 
who exercise governmental — law making — prerogatives in a society. The 
authority of citizens and persons can be defined in a way that limits the prero-
10 Sartori, Giovanni: Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 2nd ed., Macmillan Press 
Ltd., Basingstoke, 1994, p. 196. 
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gatives of officials frequently identified in a declaration of rights.11 In turn, the 
exercise of governmental prerogatives should be subject to a division of labor 
associated with the separation of powers. Such prerogatives, in turn, can be 
subject to veto capabilities pertaining to a system of checks and balances. The 
basic architecture of governmental arrangements implies procedures involving 
a due process of law that facilitates contestation among those interested so that 
conflict resolution is obtained as complementarities among interested parties 
who now achieve their place in a shared community of understanding.”12  
The core of the problem arises from the real aims of the constitution ma-
kers, or the prevailing political elite. The drafting of constitutions and acts of 
constitutional importance makes only an initial, expert stage of constitutional 
engineering, which requires a deep insight into the nature of the means to be 
implemented, as well as of the community of people it is meant to obligate. 
Between the resulting constitutional act and “the living constitution” comes a 
process of implementation, which profoundly depends of the capacity of the 
political community and the society itself to accept the proposed solutions as 
its constituting and working principles. This explains why a different approach 
is needed for constitutional stipulations to be applied, rather than brute en-
forcement. 
2. Sharing of the executive power: theory and practice
How properly to implement the theory of separated but shared powers 
depends on the answer to the question whether parliaments can control their 
leaders in the executive. If we still believe in the function of a ruling assembly, 
than the bicameral system deserves a special attention. But the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty has been proved not to function a long time ago. 
This points the primary attention towards the executive. The functions within 
the executive have to be separated but regulated in a way to share their powers 
and thus control each other.
Although it has generally been abandoned in political analysis, the idea of 
parliamentary supremacy is still supported by the interests of politicians and 
11 Vile, M. J. C.: Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed., Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 1998, pp. 131 – 192.
12 Ostrom, Vincent: The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Designing the American 
Experiment, 3rd ed., with Barbara Allen, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2008, pp. 240 – 
243.
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by the public which is unaware of the concentration and secrecy of political 
power. The doctrine of parliamentary democracy continues to be dominant in 
political life.13 
Power, regardless of the application of a certain model of governmental 
organization, tends to be concentrated in the hands of the executive. There-
fore, constitutionally drawn positions of the branches of power are actually in 
reverse with regard to functions they are intended to perform: the executive 
makes decisions and formulates texts, which are subsequently ‘passed’ by re-
presentative bodies in order to achieve legitimacy. There no longer exists a 
distinction between the executive power which rules and the legislative power 
which makes laws. The distinction is rather between the ruling power, which 
has the authority to act, and the controlling power, which has to balance it. 
The authority to act decides and issues commands to all governmental bodies 
and co-ordinates their activities as well. The controlling power is supposed to 
oversee and impose limitations on the authority to act, and to ensure that ac-
tions undertaken by the authority to act are both legal and in agreement with 
the political will of the nation.14
However, modern assemblies cannot perform even their fundamental con-
trolling functions. During the 1960s and 1970s, this line of thinking prevailed 
in the constitutional literature in Western countries.15 Philip Norton, a distin-
guished British author, proposed in 1982 that the traditional formula of “the 
Queen in Parliament” should be replaced by “the Prime Minister in Cabinet”, 
a metaphor which would make relationships in the highest political circles 
more transparent. Norton offers particularly important evidence that parlia-
mentary control is weakest in such areas as foreign policy, defense and security 
services, while parliamentary involvement is most concentrated in the areas 
of public services and finance. While the latter is by no means unimportant, 
13 See Suleiman, Ezra N.: Parliaments and parliamentarians in democratic politics, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1986, p. 11.
14 Smerdel, Branko: Ustavne institucije ministarske odgovornosti i njihovo moderno značenje, 
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 32, No. 2-3, 1977, pp. 67 – 83; Gaude-
met, op. cit. (fn. 6), p. 19. 
15 See e.g. Vile, op. cit. (fn. 11), pp. 21 ff.; Chardenagor, André: Un Parlement, pourqoui 
faire?, Gallimard, Paris, 1967; Bracher, Karl D.: Problems of parliamentary democracy in 
Europe, in Hirsh, Herbert; Hancock, Donald M. (eds.): Comparative legislative systems, 
Free Press, New York, 1971, pp. 343 – 360; Walkland, S. A.: Whither the Commons?, 
in Walkland, S. A.; Ryle, Michael (eds.): The study of Parliament group: the Commons 
in the seventies, Fontana Colins, Glasgow, 1977.
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it demonstrates that the most sensitive fields of governmental action, those 
associated with the use of coercion, have remained outside any democratic 
scrutiny. An Economist editorial included similar comments about the British 
Constitution in November 1995.16
This theory must be considered while deciding on the fundamental consti-
tutional choices, as well as in operational or specific decision making.17 Those 
of the first category have usually been completed during great historical events, 
such as constitutional conventions and popular referenda.18 They are inscribed 
into the “marble of the Constitution”. The choices of the second category are 
done during the implementation, on a daily basis, through elaboration and 
adoption of legislation, adjudication of disputes, down to enforcement over 
those who have disobeyed the law. The process of implementation of the con-
stitution should include decisions of legislators, courts of justice, the police, 
agencies, firms, and individuals.19
However, in regard to the constitutional design of a system of government, 
the knowledge, intentions and behavior of the political leaders is of crucial 
importance. The acts of the common citizens in everyday life are of impor-
tance to the extent that they were willing to tolerate deviations from the con-
stitutional principles. The result of an interaction of both processes is called 
“a working constitution”, which is usually quite different from the one on 
the books. But, not to be mistaken: neither the elites produce and form their 
attitude towards constitutionalism of their free will, nor does the will of the 
citizens to participate in political decision-making processes depend on free 
decision making. The dominant interests, the oligarhisation of the parties and 
the irresistible apparatus of coercion have brought a tendency to push the 
constitutions aside as a window dressing of the systems. The state repressions, 
weakening of union movements, as well as unemployment and other corollari-
es of the economic crisis have essentially diminished the impact of deliberative 
processes. The result is the immense and often violent public demonstrations 
we observe daily in the core countries of the free world. Something has gone 
16 The Economist, November 4th,1995, pp. 60 – 62.
17 Smerdel, Branko: Republic of Croatia: Three Fundamental Constitutional Choices, Croa-
tian Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1992, pp. 60 – 78.
18 See more in Ostrom, Vincent: The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, University 
of Nebrasca Press, Lincoln, 1987; and Smerdel, Branko: American Theories of Federa-
lism, introduction to the Croatian translation, Informator, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 5 – 49.
19 Cf. Tribe, Lawrence H.: Constitutional Choices, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1985.
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wrong with democracy, concludes the prestigious The Economist, not forgetting 
the question: “How to revive it?”20
3. The role of the political parties
While constitutional documents might be elaborated with great scientific 
consideration and knowledge, there is no guarantee that they would function 
as their creators have intended and indeed tried to persuade the public to 
expect. Erroneous constitutional choices might be caused by a lack of knowled-
ge. But they are time and again concealed under the democratic pretext, while 
inspired only by a desire for power, domestically as well as internationally.21 
The key lies with the political parties. During the 1990s the constitutional 
arrangement supported a personalization of power. But its main instrument 
was control over the political parties. The CDU had been the main instrument 
of Tuđman’s wielding the power over the all branches of government. Since 
the year 2000 the party dominance has disfigured the democratic constituti-
onal facade of the new parliamentary system and its deterioration lasts until 
the present. Parlamentarism actually functions as a system based on party 
obedience!22 What a nice surprise for the ignorant Croatian partitocracy!23
During the Croatian constitutional “democratic transition” of the last twenty 
five years, an enormous gap was created between the proclaimed principles and 
the prevalent constitutional culture (opinio constitutionis). Because of that the 
constitutional system has been pushed into an entirely different direction, i.e. 
towards a concentration of all decision-making power in one single center of 
decision making, closely clustered around the one powerful individual. Since the 
Constitution provides for multiple such centers, one of which technically out of 
party control, this has induced a number of constitutional disputes, and also a 
permament pressure towards abandoning the power sharing system.
20 The Economist, March 1, 2014, pp. 43 – 50.
21 Smerdel, Branko: Convention on the Constitution of Europe: relevance of the theory of a 
compound republic, wow 4 conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, 2006. Ava-
ilable at: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/; Podolnjak, Robert: Explaining the 
failure of the European constitution: a constitution-making perspective, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2007, pp. 119 – 167.
22 Classic general survey of the role of political parties: Sartori, Giovanni: Stranke i 
stranački sustavi: analitički okvir, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2002 (translated by Vla-
dimira Mirković Blažević and Vesna Tomić).
23 Smerdel, Branko: Promjena vlasti i izgledi ustavne vladavine, in Kregar, Josip; Ravlić, 
Slaven, et al. (eds.): Hrvatska: kako dalje?, Pravni fakultet, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 85 – 94.
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4. The continuing challenges
The question remains therefore, whether it is really possible to use constitu-
tional instruments to strengthen democratic forces and accelerate the process 
of institutionalization despite the patrimonial political culture amidst a bunch 
of dominant political leaders? Or are we, in Hamilton’s words, forever desti-
ned in organizing the government to depend on accident and force?
The search for solutions leads us to two propositions. First, if the executive 
is the central obstacle to the prescribed role of the parliament, the focus should 
be on taming the executive, and if the separation of powers is the best insti-
tutional mechanism to tame the power holders, then our efforts to strengthen 
democratic elements of the system must be directed to the internal division of 
authority within the executive. Second, if the main instrument of dominance 
over the whole parliamentary system consists in control of the political parties, 
how to point those constitutional checks towards them, and by what means? 
In Croatia, as Tocqueville writes for the new republican system of the 19th 
century, those have been demonstrated as “ideas hitherto unknown or deemed 
impracticable”.
III. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE: THE TENDENCY TOWARDS    
 PRESIDENTIALISM
1. Strengthening the executive: the semi-presidential system (1990) 
The term “semi-presidential system” has taken roots in Croatia, although a 
“presidential-parliamentary” or “a rationalized parlamentarism” would better 
denote the constitutional intentions. This would have to be distinguished from 
“presidentialism”, the system of concentrated and personalized power with a 
number of variations, from the “Stalinist etatism” to the Latin American “cau-
dillism”. But the elements of centralization are implied in the model. It could 
even be said that the term “semi” took hold because it intentionally disguises 
its real nature, which without a doubt stresses the role of the president more 
than the “presidential system” based on a separation and sharing of power 
in the United States.24 This goes for the pure constitutional distribution of 
24 First used by it’s oponent Maurice Duverger for the purpose of mockering it, the 
term has taken hold and became usual, and the model accepted by the earlier oppo-
nents. The last attempt from the French left to abandon it, was launched only as 
the end of the second Miterrand’s mandate approached in 1985.
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powers, generally as well as in the French instance, which opens a possibility 
of development towards a full concentration of power in the presidency. This 
is particularly the case in Croatia, where the concentration of power, which 
would be, however, inevitable during the war and a prolonged state of fragile 
cease-fire, together with a personal political style of the incumbent, gave rise to 
allegations of “authoritative”, “personalized” or even “dictatorial” functioning 
of Tuđman’s presidency25, and a perpetual discussion and demands for a chan-
ge of the constitutional framework of an “imperial presidency”.
The key constitutional ground for such a development is found in the pro-
visions by which the president is responsible (1) to ensure respect for the 
Constitution; (2) to guarantee the continuity and unity of the Republic, and 
(3) to ensure the regular functioning of the governmental institutions. From 
those, a number of “implied powers” might be, and indeed have been, derived. 
Broadly interpreted, such responsibilities include, particularly in the states of 
emergency, whether officially declared or not, a variety of means to intervene 
in any field of administration whenever deemed necessary, i.e. full control over 
governmental institutions, the armed forces and security services. When such 
circumstances occur is determined exclusively by the president himself, with 
the exception of a formal declaration of war which has been reserved for the 
parliament. Those constitutional provisions have been claimed by the presi-
dent and his legal counsels in various cases when challenged for his actions in 
foreign and domestic politics.26
 
2. The organization of presidential supremacy beyond the Constitution
Despite the constitutional provisions on the separation of powers, the focus 
of power in the Croatian political system very soon became firmly entrenched 
with the president and his office. The Office of the President and his advisory 
bodies make up the administrative and political basis. But the essential supre-
macy was ensured by the paramount presence of the ruling party in political 
life.
25 Cf. for instance discussions of the time: Letica, Slaven: Is Franjo Tuđman a Dictator, 
Globus, Zagreb, November 29, 1992; Letica, Slaven: The Serbian Strategy of War and 
All Tuđman’s Mistakes, Globus, Zagreb, August 2, 1991. 
26 Cf. Babac, Branko: O nekim općim problemima uobličavanja političko-upravnog ustrojstva 
u svezi s ostvarivanjem nacionalnih strategija razvoja Hrvatske i hrvatskoga građanskog druš-
tva: teorijske i istraživačke osnove, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 42, No. 
1, 1992, pp. 63 - 67.
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Under Article 106 of the Constitution, he appoints, chairs and dismisses 
the Presidential Council “and other advisory and auxiliary bodies”. The ad-
visory body had been founded under the title of the Supreme Council of the 
State. This title, unknown to the language of the Constitution, was a point of 
much criticism from the opposition. After the elections of 1992 it was replaced 
by two other advisory bodies: the Presidential Council and the Council of Defense 
and National Security.27 The former consisted of about thirty top legislative, 
executive and the ruling party officials, whilst in the latter sat the chairman 
of the parliament, the Prime Minister, the ministers of defense and interior, 
together with the top military commanders and heads of the security agencies. 
Sessions of those bodies have always been closed to the public and only brief 
releases were issued after sessions. Reportedly, those were the places where 
the president after deliberations had the final word and made decisions, which 
were then executed by the government and by the party machine, passing 
through the legislature if necessary.
The president communicated with the public on his regular monthly press 
conferences held in the Official Residence of the President before invited do-
mestic and foreign journalists, which were directly transmitted over the radio 
and television.28 The intention to receive common citizens at the Residence 
once a month was announced after the elections, but was later forgotten. The 
top administration was organized in the Office of the President, located in the 
President’s Residence. The number of advisors, which at one point on the eve 
of war counted dozens, threatened to transform into a parallel government. 
The Office of the President became the main place from which people were 
detached to important positions at home and abroad if not eliminated from 
ranks of candidate for such positions.29 Hrvoje Šarinić, Prime Minister from 
August 1992 to March 1993 had previously held the position of Director of 
the Office, and was appointed, after his resignation, Head of the Office for Na-
tional Security which controls and coordinates activities of all intelligence and 
security services. In general, fast rotation of selected cadres makes a characte-
27 After the Supreme Council of the State was abolished, president Tuđman explained 
that it had been necessary to form such a body in the situation when the Yugoslav 
Army generals, preparing a conspiracy and aggression against the Republic, would 
claim their right for membership in the Presidential Council.
28 On one occasion in August, 1993 Tuđman had chatted on the TV in a relaxed way 
with a group of journalists, in an apparent attempt to improve his image in commu-
nicating with the public. But it has never been repeated.
29 Letica, Slaven: Obećana zemlja, Globus, Zagreb, 1992.
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ristic part of the Croatian political process. Of course, in such rapid rotation, 
there are those who are launched out of the circle.
The officially denounced “communist” principle of unity of power was repla-
ced by the principle of “single state politics” meaning the single center of aut-
hority.30 The democratic prospects were diminished by the urgent necessities of 
the armed conflict and its aftermath. Regarding the Constitution, the traditional 
function of being a window to the world was accepted and nourished by the new 
nationalist political elite. It was almost sacrificed to the patrimonial tradition af-
ter the victory in the war, when proposals to make Franjo Tudjman “a president 
for life” were advanced by some top functionaries. But the public reception of 
this proposal was unsympathetic, and has not been repeated.
IV. INTRODUCING THE POWER SHARING
1. The meaning and importance of the principle of separation of powers
The true meaning of the principle of separation of powers lies in dividing 
power, and thus the possibility to enable mutual checks and balances betwe-
en the holders of the highest governmental functions, but not in a bare or-
ganizational and functional separation of the three fundamental branches of 
government. It encompasses the horizontal dimension, which regulates the 
relations between the holders of the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
branch, as well as the vertical dimension, regulating relations between the cen-
tral government and the local self-governments.
Properly understood, the separation of powers represents, within the de-
mocratic political system, the most efficient and, in the practice of democratic 
governments, approved institutional means to prevent a concentration and 
personalization of power. In democratic states, it is implemented within the 
framework of several different systems of governmental organization: parlia-
mentary, semi-presidential and presidential system of government.
Besides the general political oversight over governmental operations and 
a strengthening of the system of its responsibility, the role of the Parliament 
30 The Prime Minister Nikica Valentić (1993 – 1995) took a great care to publicly 
emphasize that he is “only to execute the single politics of the state”. The next Pri-
me Minister Zlatko Mateša (1995 – 2000), consistently insisted on the “economic 
but not political” function of the Government. Cf. Smerdel, Branko, interview of 
May 25, 1992, in Šarin, Duška: Nastanak hrvatskog Ustava, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 
1997, pp. 244 – 251.
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is emphasized by the participation of its president in the decision making by 
the President of the Republic. In performing this function the president of the 
Parliament does not act as an independent constitutional and political factor, 
but represents the Parliament and must take good care of the opinions of the 
majority of legislators and continuously ensure their support.
1.1. What is the purpose of a double-headed executive?
It has been paradigmatically established in constitutional science31 that the 
word ‘executive’ has been intentionally used in order to misguide the under-
standing of the political process. In a word, the masters of the state power and 
assets have from the earliest times wisely pretended to be mere servants of the 
people. In modern democracies they are obligatory constitutionally defined as 
such servants of the ruling people, which by no means have changed the real 
nature of rulers-ruled relations in the modern society. This is why a study of 
the development of the organization and operation of the executive power 
might open a view to understanding the substantial problems and prospects of 
the democratic development of a particular country. 
The ideas of the strengthening of parliaments as checks and controllers of 
real power holders, although still surviving, have been seriously challenged in 
a major part of the literature. Would it not then be more recommendable for 
the countries with no democratic traditions to introduce checks to the mecha-
nisms which actually must be checked? 
The Croatian presidency, as the instance at stake, has been created in the 
year 2000 for the purpose of preventing the occurrence of such a concentrati-
on and personalization of power as was the case in the previous decade. The 
idea of “separated but shared” powers was implemented, with a significant in-
fluence of the theory of checks and balances. The model was designed in order 
to enhance cooperation among the three leading functionaries: the President 
of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the President of the Parliament.32
31 The science about comparative constitutionalism, being neccessarily interdiscipli-
nary, encompassing such scientific disciplines as constitutional political economy and 
social psychology, as well as law, might in our view be entitled constitutional scien-
ce. See Smerdel, Branko: Ustavno uređenje europske Hrvatske, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 
2013; Hirschl, Ron: Comparative Matters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. 
32 For more see Smerdel, Branko: Odgovornost Vlade u europskom kontekstu, kako europske 
(parlamentarne) institucije “rade svoj posao”, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 
Vol. 60, No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 7 – 42.
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2. The Constitutional Status of the President of the Republic 
2.1. The model of cooperation
In the elaboration of this cooperative model, the following instruments 
have been applied: a proposal of certain decisions; a counter-signature of the 
Prime Minister to the acts of the President of the Republic, requirement for 
an opinion to be given by the president of the Croatian National Parliament, 
or common decision making by those three highest officials of the Croatian 
government. Normally, it is up to the President of the Parliament to ensure 
the support of a majority of the members of the Parliament, and up to the 
Prime Minister to ensure the support of the members of this body. Although 
the right to dissolve the Parliament makes an essential element for the achie-
vement of a balance between the legislative and the executive, which makes 
the basis of the parliamentary system, the Croatian political reformers of the 
year 2000 and 2001 decided to seriously limit such a possibility to only two 
situations: the vote of censure to the Government and the refusal to adopt the 
budget for the period of 120 days. 
As of the constitutional revision of the year 2000 the Constitution of Cro-
atia drops the reference to “Head of the State”, which is a curiosum in the 
constitutional world, being a result of the ignorant lessening of the role of the 
President. Still the President has a responsible authority: The President of the 
Republic of Croatia represents and stands for the Republic of Croatia at home 
and abroad, and assures the regular and harmonized functioning and stability of 
the government.The President of the Republic is responsible for the defense of in-
dependence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. The President 
of the Republic shall not perform any other public or professional duty, nor 
shall he be a member of a political party.The President of the Republic is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, and he appo-
ints and dismisses military commanders, in conformity with the law. 
On the basis of a decision of the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Re-
public may declare war and conclude peace.
In the event of an immediate threat to the independence, unity and existen-
ce of the State, the President of the Republic may, with the counter-signature 
of the Prime Minister, order the deployment of the Armed Forces even if a state of 
war has not been declared.
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2.2. The source of authority: a direct election by the people
The President of the Republic is elected in direct elections by secret ballot, 
on the basis of the universal and equal right to vote, for a term of five years. 
No one can be elected President of the Republic more than twice. 
The President of the Republic shall be elected by a majority of voters who tur-
ned out. If none of the candidates have obtained such a majority, new elections 
shall be held after 14 days. 
The two candidates who obtained the largest number of votes in the first 
round shall have the right to stand in the second round. If one of these candi-
dates withdraws, the candidate who obtained the next highest number of votes 
shall acquire the right to stand in the second round.
2.3. Government formation
It should be stressed that the President of the Republic gives the mandate to 
form the Government to the person who, upon the distribution of seats in the Cro-
atian Parliament and consultations held with the parliamentary clubs, enjoys the 
confidence of the majority of MPs. Although he does not appoint or dismiss 
the Prime Minister, nor his deputies or Ministers, he might influence coalition 
formation, since there is no obligation to confer a mandate to the leader of the 
party with the greatest number of seats (relative majority).
During a state of war the President of the Republic may issue decrees with 
the force of law on the grounds of and within the authority obtained from the 
Croatian Parliament. If the Croatian Parliament is not in session, the Presi-
dent of the Republic is authorized to regulate any issue required by the state 
of war by decrees with the force of law.
This essentially corresponds to known legal standards, and the criteria to be 
applied at such times are established by the Constitution itself.
 
2.4. Separated by shared executive powers 
Taking care of the regular and coordinated functioning of the institutions 
and the stability of the state (Article 94 of the Constitution) might potentially 
make room for an active intervention of the President into the political life. 
This provision has been interpreted differently by different Presidents.
The Government of the Republic of Croatia exercises executive powers and 
is accountable to the Croatian Parliament. The President of the Republic and 
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the Government of the Republic of Croatia cooperate in the formulation and 
execution of foreign policy. 
The Government and the President cooperate in the coordination and di-
rection of security services, and have to countersign the appointments of their 
chief officers.
The President of the Republic, at the Government’s proposal and with the 
countersignature of the Prime Minister, decides on the establishment of diplo-
matic missions and consular offices of the Republic of Croatia abroad. 
The President of the Republic, with the prior countersignature of the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Croatia, appoints and recalls diplomatic represen-
tatives of the Republic of Croatia, at the proposal of the Government and upon 
receiving the opinion of the competent committee of the Croatian Parliament.
The President of the Republic receives credentials and letters of recall from 
foreign diplomatic representatives.
The President of the Republic may propose to the Government to hold a se-
ssion and consider certain issues, and may be present at the session of the Go-
vernment and take part in the discussion.33
3. The functioning of the Croatian “hybrid presidency”
3.1. Deficiencies of institutionalization
Therefore, as we asserted earlier, the attitude towards the system of checks 
and balances among the Croatian political elite, could be compared to the 
metaphor on the “ideas hitherto unknown and deemed impracticable” in 
DeTocqueville’s analysis of democracy (1830). By his qualification Tocque-
ville emphasizes the innovation and originality brought by the introduction of 
the system of checks and balances for the new American republic, whose foun-
ders were still in doubt whether they would be able to keep it.34 John Dewey 
in his “The Public and its Problems” asserts: “Be the evils what they may, the 
33 Also: to call elections for the Croatian Parliament and call its first session; to call 
referenda, in conformity with the Constitution; to give the mandate to form the 
Government to the person who, upon the distribution of seats in the Croatian Par-
liament and consultations, enjoys the confidence of the majority of its members; 
to grant pardons; to confer decorations and other awards specified by law. To take 
care about the regular and coordinate functioning of the institutions of and the 
stability of the state.
34 Cf. Ostrom, Vincent: The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies, 
The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000, pp. 14 – 15.
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experiment is not yet played out. The United States are not yet made: they are 
not a finished fact to be categorically assessed.” (1927). And John Stuart Mill 
warned that all the limits to the rulers, imposed by the modern civilization, 
obviously move human beings away from their nature (1885).35
“There cannot be more than one power in this country!” This was boldly 
announced by the Croatian Prime Minister Milanović on February 24, 2015.36 
This statement best demonstrates how distant the sophisticated system of sha-
red power and mutual checks, imposed by the constitutional revision of 2000 
is to the prevalent Croatian political culture. At the same time this should 
explain why the process of institutionalization of the constitutionally provi-
ded cooperation between the three high dignitaries – two from the executive, 
and the third one from the legislative branch – has been slow, reticent, even 
absent during the last fifteen years. The rules have been passed as a matter 
of political bias and not to improve the institution37, the cases have not been 
noted, analyzed or quoted, the constitutional disputes have been ignited anew, 
and no disagreements have been solved in the spirit of cooperation, which is 
imminent to the divided system. The expected process of mutual adoption of 
the power sharing system never took place. To rule together, people in power 
must share the common idea that the powers delegated to them by the people 
would certainly have to be returned and the account laid, and that the powers 
not only can but must be shared as provided by the Constitution. This then 
also explains the hypothesis that the operation of the Croatian presidency pre-
valently depends on the characters and tempers of the individuals involved.38
 
35 Dewey, John: The Public and its Problems, Holt, New York, 1927, quoted in Sunstain, 
Cass: The Partial Constitution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, p. 
I.
36 See in Večernji list, 25.02.2015. To make sure the fact we point out here that the 
Article 4 of the Constitution clearly regulates the separation of branches of go-
vernment and their limitation by the constitutional guarantees of local selfgo-
vernment. 
37 The case with the initiative to adopt the Law on the Office of the President as soon 
as “the leftist” President Josipović took office in 2011, Article 107 par. 2 of the 
Constitution.
38 The basics of political psychology in: Houghton, Patrick: Political Psychology, 
Routledge, New York, 2009, availiable at: http://www.al-edu.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/Houghton-Political-Psychology.pdf (14.03.2015); the political 
psychology of the classical scientific analysts examines Elster, Jon: Political Psycho-
logy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
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3.2. Three models of presidency
We hold that three models of presidency have developed during the past 
twenty five years. First is the imperial presidency of Dr. Franjo Tuđman (1990-
2000), which has been abandoned but deserves to be taken into account, since 
its ghost still threatens Croatian democracy. It actually represents the model 
rather close to parts of the Croatian political elite. It was based upon the Con-
stitution of 1990, while the strong constitutional position of the President 
was also supported by the popular demand in the time of crisis, as well as the 
strong political party under presidential control. We have entitled this system 
“imperial presidency” after previous comparisons with the supreme military 
commanders from the ancient Roman Republic, the French revolution, and up 
to the instance of Yugoslavia. After the war, the victorious general transforms 
the system into “an elective monarchy” or a “Caesarian” form of dictatorship. 
This system was successfully abandoned in the year 2000.
The other two models, however, have operated within the same kind of 
constitutional framework, but in radically different modes. This explains our 
hypothesis about the overly accentuated impact of personalities in the functi-
oning of institutions, as well as limits to honest cooperation due to the centra-
lized character of the Croatian political parties.
The second model, transitional presidency (2000-2010) during the two man-
dates of Stipe Mesić, was expected to produce a stabile and institutionalized 
system of power sharing between the President of Republic and the Prime 
Minister. We refer to the first period after the end of imperial presidency as 
transitional presidency, since the question of whether such a system would be 
accepted as a working model has been constantly posed and reopened during 
the two mandates of Stipe Mesić. Mesić did not hesitate to make at least two 
hard choices claiming his constitutional and legal duties. One was the decision 
of 2000 to force into retirement a number of leading generals who had attemp-
ted to address the public in purely political matters. The second was to reject 
the decision of the government to join the U.S. action against Hussein’s Iraq 
in 2003 since it lacked the approval of the UN’s Security Council. Both prime 
ministers, however embarrassed with the presidential actions, continued to 
cooperate, which gave an impression that the system would rather easily enter 
into gear.39 
39 \ikić, Ivica; Pavelić, Boris: Mesić, Novi list, Rijeka, 2010.
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The third model is self-restrained presidency of Professor Ivo Josipović (2011-
2015), which showed deep obstacles to power sharing between two dignitaries 
who had originated from the same political party or orientation. The main 
characteristic of the model was a strictly legally narrow interpretation of the 
authority of the president, which in our view justifies the qualification of a se-
lf-restrained presidency. Not only did the President interpret his competences 
strictly and fail to attempt a wider, contextual or teleological interpretation, 
but he also tended to give in when some important new pieces of legislation 
imposed further restrictions to his authority.40 The president took the position 
of an impartial dignitary who cooperates with all parties, and supports any 
government. In regard to his competences, he applied the doctrine of self-re-
straint and scrupulously avoided any extensive interpretation of his authority 
and his duties in general. He tended to avoid any public disagreement with 
the government, any decisive intervention against unconstitutional legislati-
on, and to give in on various questions of legislation related to his sharing of 
authority with the government. To the numerous grievances by the citizens 
he attempted to react in the manner of a Scandinavian ombudsman – by case 
work with various agencies of government and administration.41 This is why 
we have termed the Josipović presidency a self-restrained one.
3.3. Political parties disregard the Constitution
The causes of such differences lie in the dominance of the political parti-
es: Dr. Franjo Tuđman followed the centralized party model, personally con-
40 The Law on Cooperation between the Parliement and the Government (NN [Of-
ficial Gazette] 81/2013) excluded the President from those aspects of politics, with 
the explanation that it has not been foreign policy any more. The Law on National 
Defense and the Law on the Service in the Armed Forces (NN 73/2013) were aimed 
to restrict the President’s authority of the supreme commader, but Josipović denied 
that there are serious differences. “I do not demand any new authority, I just plead 
not to change the old law.” he said in that occasion. Cf. Josipović demantirao da je 
u sukobu s Vladom zbog Zakona o obrani: Ne tražim veće ovlasti!, Index, June 8, 2013, 
http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/josipovic-demantirao-da-je-u-sukobu-s-vladom-
zbog-zakona-o-obrani-ne-trazim-vece-ovlasti/682264.aspx (30.03.2015). 
41 At the beginning of his mandate in 2011, the attention he had paid to the rating 
pools had been generally interpreted in terms of gathering support for his very 
ambitious electoral program of “new Justice”. But, despite the fact that his ratings 
were enormously high up to the very end of mandate, such an action had not taken 
place. See our Profesor Josipović at the constitutional law exam, in Smerdel, Branko: O 
ustavima i ljudima, Novi informator, Zagreb, 2011, pp. 35 – 37.
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trolled his ever-strengthening party and that was the instrument of his political 
omnipotence. The destiny of the Constitution, and that means the separation 
of powers, eventually depended on his famous answer to the question as to 
what will happen if he loses in a future presidential election, when he replied 
“Only those who live to see it will know”.42 Our warning from 2003 that the 
party heads seeking dominance threatened the constitutional system was not 
only disregarded, like a number of other such caveats, but was completely 
confirmed.43 
Stipe Mesić dissociated himself very early on from his former party and 
operated as a truly non-conformist president. No doubt, his individualist atti-
tude greatly contributed to the perception of a “maverick” president. But, ne-
vertheless, he was ready for serious action when he deemed it necessary, as well 
as for various coalitions when demanded by the situation, or out of his own 
interest. Therefore, his presidency was a “transitional” one, as was the whole 
political environment.44  
Professor Ivo Josipović attempted to visibly detach himself from his former 
party and disassociate himself from the extremely unpopular President of SDP 
Zoran Milanović only later in his mandate. He tried to “move to the right” 
with the approaching electoral campaign, but it was too little and too late. 
Taking his presidency as a whole, his refined manners and a gentle political 
style constantly brought him an enormously high rating among active poli-
ticians, which supports our thesis about the decisive role of the incumbent’s 
personality. However, two sets of evidence go in favour of our thesis of the 
decisive impact of political parties. The first is the history of his constitutional 
disputes with the rightist-center Government and its Prime Minister Jadranka 
Kosor during the first year of his mandate. The second refers to his rare, late 
and reluctant interventions regarding various pieces of legislation and even the 
curious package of constitutional changes, which was negotiated and prepared 
to be adopted without any respect to the rules of legislative drafting. Some of 
his statements about the general disagreement with his former party during 
the first month after his failed re-election confirm our thesis. 
42 The actual expression was “Kibi-dabi”, meaning in the old slang of Zagreb, “Only 
those who live to see it will know”. This was the answer the president gave in a TV 
interview. In fact, he had quite often expressed the opinion that there was nobody 
in view who could replace him .
43 Smerdel, op. cit. (fn. 23), p. 89.
44 Dekanić, Igor: Demokratizacija hrvatske politike, Prometej, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 282 – 287.
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Considering the above, the future of the Croatian presidency has not yet 
been determined, nor is there a basis for a grounded scientific prediction. It 
should be decided during the next few years, depending on the results of the 
upcoming general elections, and the political character of Mrs. Kolinda Gra-
bar-Kitarović. If she successfully establishes an independent position in the 
Croatian political realm, which has been subordinated to the leadership of the 
political parties, the system of mutual checks and balances might survive. If 
not, it is likely that constitutional changes would follow, which would relocate 
the focus of executive power to the head of the Government. And the key test 
takes place only when the two top officials, the President and the Prime Mini-
ster, come from opposed political orientations. 
In conclusion, we hold that the further development of the system remains 
uncertain unless a serious planned effort is undertaken in order to recover the 
lost balance between the institutions.
V. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 
1. The initial reception of the principles of cooperation and power sha-
ring
The formerly described concept, according to which a separation of powers 
requires an elaboration of various forms of collaboration and cooperation in deci-
sion making, as well as mutual checks of the heads of the three separate branches 
of government, has been consequently applied in all the relevant provisions of 
the proposal to amend the Constitution. The basic model presumes the parti-
cipation of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Croatian 
National Parliament in the making of the most important political decisions.
That way, the concept known in modern political theory as “a rationali-
zed parliamentary system” could be accomplished since it aims to avoid insti-
tutional weaknesses of the classical parliamentary system which might cause 
government instability, and to prevent at the same time a regression towards 
presidentialism as a system of concentrated and personalized power. 
The very idea of sharing power has been a novelty not only to the Croatian 
political community, but also to a part of the scientific one. Important foreign 
observers held the new system to be a rather incongruous innovation within 
the Croatian tradition of strong leaders and its patrimonial political culture.45 
45 As had been openly stated in the year 2000 to the author after the presentation of 
the system by the than very influential U.S. ambassador William Montgomery, 
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Ambitious political leaders did not and could not understand the system of 
divided but shared powers otherwise but as a window dressing for the masses.46 
It seems that this attitude has not changed much during the course of the last 
fifteen years. If anything, it has become stronger. 
Since those days the discussion has constantly been simmering in Croatian 
politics, only to be intensified from time to time on the initiative of political 
leaders to “remove the remnants of the semi presidential system” and to intro-
duce “the pure parliamentary system”. Those would be all the constitutionally 
provided forms of mutual cooperation which, as we have explained, make the 
core of the theoretical concept of governmental organization. The logically 
following question of whether the president of the Republic should be elected 
directly by the people or by the Parliament in such a pure system has usually 
caused new disputes among the proponents of “systematic purity”.47
2. Is modern Croatia better prepared for a system of power sharing?
Apparently, it is not. As already mentioned here, the current Prime Mini-
ster Zoran Milanović, already well known for his particular interpretations of 
the Constitution and opposition to the system of checks and balances, openly 
proclaimed fifteen years later: “There cannot be two supreme authorities in 
this country!”48 True, it was a fuming answer to the obviously unconstitutional 
request from the new President Mrs. Grabar-Kitarović who, being embarrassed 
by the previous messages from the Government, invited the Prime Minister to 
resign. 
quoting from memory: “American political theory has no place in this area. The 
ultimate focus of power must be defined by the Constitution.”
46 Described by Hrvoje Šarinić in his memoirs on negotiations with the Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milošević during the 1990s; Šarinić, Hrvoje: Svi moji tajni pregovori s Milo-
ševićem 1993-1995, Globus, Zagreb, 1999.
47 Thus the positive system has been named “the quarter – presidential one” and even 
“the filthy parliamentary one”. Smerdel, Branko: Ustavne promjene i hrvatski parla-
mentarni sustav – argumenti u prilog pozitivnog ustavnog modela ustrojstva vlasti, in Kačer, 
Hrvoje; Momčinović, Hrvoje; Žuvela, Mladen (eds): Liber amicorum in honorem 
Jadranko Crnić (1928-2008), Novi informator, Zagreb, 2009, pp. 37 – 73; Smerdel, 
Branko: Parlamentarni sustav i stabilnost hrvatskog Ustava: Slijede li nakon predsjedničkih 
izbora nove promjene ustrojstva vlasti?, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 60, 
No. 1, 2010, pp. 7 – 44. 
48 See fn. 36.
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To tell the truth, it was an angry response to a contemptuous invitation 
to attend meetings of the Government, but only if she is well prepared. This 
again being an angry response to hostile actions of the Government deman-
ding an immediate fulfillment of the electoral promise to move out of Tito’s 
old villa which has served as the presidential residence for the last twenty 
years. This and other similar quarrels suggest that a new cycle of constitutio-
nally prescribed cooperation has begun and continued in the form of a quarrel. 
The impression that both top functionaries are ignoring or have not read the 
Constitution, or lack competent constitutional advisers might be wrong. It 
rather shows that neither of them takes it seriously enough. But, as the oppo-
sition leader Tomislav Karamarko asserted after the inauguration of the new 
President of the Republic, Mrs. Grabar-Kitarović: “cooperation in accordance 
with the Constitution has to be established, although, everything has started 
somewhat clumsily and maliciously.” This is our purpose here: to warn about 
the inherent logic of such conflicts, which poison the political atmosphere and 
which could get out of control.
The moment when we examine the constitutional role of the Croatian pre-
sident and its actual operation during the 15 years, and the prospects of the 
system, are particularly challenging, since the proposals to reform the system 
of the double-headed executive have been continuously challenged by party le-
aders.49 Is there an opportunity for the power greedy party leaders entrenched 
in the Parliament to get rid of the directly elected head of state?50
Aarend Lijphart, in his scientific bestseller on the times of drafting nume-
rous constitutions for new democracies, has drawn two important conclusions, 
confirmed since by a whole body of literature on the topic: first, the con-
stitution makers are far from being free to select the model of government, 
since its functionality crucially depends on the culture and traditions of the 
society.51 The second one, that the statistics demonstrates a relatively greater 
49 The new President of the Republic Mrs. Grabar-Kitarović was sworn in and assu-
med the duty of the President on February 19, 2015. 
50 In addition to the several assertions by the influential former Prime Minister Nikica 
Valentić from the opposition CDU, and other objections by the Prime Minister 
Zoran Milanović, from the ruling SDP, the opposition leader Tomislav Karamarko 
has recently expressed an opinion in favor of the “powers of the chancellor”. See: 
www.vecernji.hr/.../smerdel-jedino-je-ivo-sanader-koristio-ovlasti-i-vlad...; and also: 
www.jutarnji.hr/komentar-jelene-lovric...zeli-ovlasti...je.../12573 (30.03.2015).
51 Lijphart, Aarend: Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1992, p. 25. There has not been since a significant work which would have 
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stability of parliamentary regimes, has been constantly disputed in a number of 
research works published since.52 It is puzzling how the majority of those resear-
chers failed to perceive that the conclusion about the decisive impact of culture 
and tradition warns against any conclusions based on statistical comparison 
of different societies, such as Latin American and Western European states.53
3. Should Croatia in crisis return to the drafting table?
The answer depends on our understanding of the importance of the se-
paration of powers, and our estimation of the readiness of political actors to 
observe the Constitution. All things considered, the system might be evaluated 
as working reasonably well during the three presidential mandates. Although, 
it might be judged differently, besides the instances of successful cooperation, 
we have also witnessed conflicts and arguments. 
We hold those to be part and parcel of any longer cooperation in the po-
litical sphere, and in particular when the principle of separation of powers is 
observed. The key question is whether an elaborate procedure for solving such 
controversies has been established or not. And there we see the core of the pro-
blem. In an atmosphere of slow and hesitant political institutionalization, the 
personalities of the players involved, as well as their personal political ideas, 
have had the prevalent influence on the functioning of political institutions.
Donald Lutz formulates the following purposes of the application of what 
he calls “constitutional technology”: first, the rule of law; second, democracy; 
third, maintenance of public good. Those have been expressed by the Ameri-
can Founders as “the inalienable right to life, freedom and a pursuit of hap-
piness”. But he emphasizes that the true purpose lies in the introduction of 
crucially important innovations into social life, which should serve to sustai-
nable development encompassing the development of material goods as well 
challenged this common sense conclusion, leaning upon huge historical evidence. See 
Elster, Jon: Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making, in Ginsburg, 
Tom (ed.): Comparative Constitutional Design, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2012, pp. 15 – 30. 
52 The first were Mathew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey in Presidents and Assemblies, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 40 – 46. 
53 Elgie, Robert (ed.): Semi-presidentialism in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999, pp. 285 – 292.
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as of a social morality.54 Are these not exactly the most important components 
of Croatian political life?
However, in Croatian politics the scientific approach to constitutional en-
gineering has been almost completely neglected and subdued to the intere-
sts of the ruling party. This has been the case in particular with the present 
government, since its victory in the general elections of 2011. What worries 
us even more is that apparently similar processes can be seen in a number of 
European Union member countries, and that they have had an impact on the 
functioning of the Union bodies themselves, i.e. on the governing elites of the 
European Union. 
The critical and final test of viability of any constitutional system are the 
situations of serious crises when the truth of power relations comes to light. 
But have there ever existed two generations in Europe who were spared from 
serious crises. The answer is there have not, but there actually exists one that 
has been spared from war, where Croatia unfortunately is an exception. As 
a matter of fact, the theory of constitutional engineering is a theory of how 
to deal with crises in a democratic manner. That is why it ever again returns 
from oblivion after conflicts and crises. Pessimistic evaluations of the mid 20th 
Century that “the Constitution has not fulfilled what was the most important 
expectation, to bring the social order safe from shocks and crises”55, actually 
demonstrate how enormously excessive expectations had been nurtured by the 
Western constitutionalists in the aftermath of the Second World War. They 
have been emulated in the extremely optimistic ideas at the beginning of the 
21st Century that the very constitution might bring answers to open questions 
of the future of civilization.56  
In our view a return to the constitutional approach is ‘a must’ on both 
levels (of political parties and the constitutional). This is why I consider it 
worth discussing such an impractical theory in this moment. We are in dire 
need of consolidation of constitutional systems in order to respond to new 
challenges, while simultaneously preserving the fundamental principles of de-
mocracy, human rights and freedoms and the rule of law. This requires a diffe-
54 Lutz, Donald D.: Principles of Constitutional Design, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, p. 5. For a history of ideas see Scott, Gordon: Controlling the State. 
Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1999.
55 Loewenstein, Karl: Political Power and the Governmental Process, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1957, p. 161.
56 Haberle, Peter: Ustavna država, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2004.
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rent approach to crises.57 The concept of the rule of law includes a balance of 
shared powers wherever authority has been confined. Its purpose is to enable 
mutual control. The system of power sharing has been invented and designed 
by and for rational actors. Political struggle in a democracy does not necessa-
rily bring that kind of leaders into governmental institutions.
4. Caveat to the leaders: we need to stabilize the Constitution 
Constitutional checks and barriers, however, just like all the other consti-
tutional institutions, could be employed for very different purposes. We hold 
it important to warn the relevant public about the existing idea of changing 
the Constitution in a citizen-initiated referendum.58 The idea was launched by 
the former President Josipović during the electoral campaign.59 In April 2014 
the President had formed an expert task force for a project of constitutional 
changes. The project was essentially developed, but not completed, during the 
summer of 2014. Whilst the expert materials had been kept undisclosed by 
the President’s decision60, during his campaign Josipović included a series of 
elaborated profound constitutional reforms into his electoral program entitled 
“This is the right path”.61
57 At the moment when the final version of this article is being corrected, the propo-
sals have been advanced that the conflict between the President and the Go-
vernment be solved by the new constitutional legislation. Although the proponent 
demands that certain compentences which have been narrowed by the particu-
lar pieces of legislation in the year 2013 be returned to the President, when once 
opened, the process would go according the party lines and interests. See http://
direktno.hr/en/ 2014/direkt/11416/Kolinda-treba-zakonsko-upori%C5%A1te-za-
obranu-od-opstruiraju%C4%87e-politike-Vlade.htm.
58 Art. 87 sec. 3 of the Constitution: “The Parliament shall call a referendum if so de-
manded by a ten percent of the total number of voters in the Republic of Croatia.”




60 The Constitutional Commission of the President of the Republic: Arsen Bačić, Pe-
tar Bačić, Sanja Barić, \orđe Gardašević, Zvonimir Lauc, Robert Podolnjak, Branko 
Smerdel. Ivo Josipović had worked as a leader of the group, and fully participated 
in all discussions. In some cases of disagreement, the group would apply the rule of 
the primacy of the President’s decision. Certain issues, such as the constitutionality 
of an usage of the civic initiative by the President have not been discussed.
61 Josipović: Druga Republika je pravi put, Poslovni tjednik, December 8, 2014, www.
poslovni.hr/hrvatska/josipovic-druga-republika-je-pravi-put-285382 (30.03.2015).
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Confronted with the rejection of the idea, not only by the opposing candi-
date Mrs. Grabar-Kitarović and the CDU leaders, Vladimir Šeks and Tomislav 
Karamarko, but also with strong criticism by the head of the Social Democratic 
Party, which supported his candidacy, Josipović took a new approach to consti-
tutional interpretation. He revealed his plan to initiate a civic referendum about 
constitutional reform if the parties reject his project after his re-election, so that 
an initiative from the Parliament or together with the Government shows im-
possible.62 Thus, the President of the Republic assumes the role of a potential 
initiator of the referendum on constitutional reform, just like any other citizen. 
Such a bold constitutional interpretation by the previously self-restrained Presi-
dent came as a surprise to the political and scholarly community. But there was 
virtually no political dispute, or even an academic discussion about it. Its preva-
lently political substance was avoided due to the presidential campaign, and it is 
now time to warn about the possible implications.63 
After his electoral defeat, professor Josipović apparently abandoned the 
idea in explaining his political plans and priorities. But the idea of the Presi-
dent initiating a serious constitutional reform by putting into usage a civic re-
ferendum, with the help of his political supporters has been launched. It exists 
in the public realm, not contested by anyone, and thus being actually available 
to anyone courageous enough to employ it after the “Candidate Josipović’s 
interpretation”.64 It could be employed by the actual President of the Republic 
to strengthen her authority, but also for various other purposes, one among 
them to forsake a direct election and power sharing of the President, as has 
been rather often proposed by the current Prime Minister Milanović, but also 
in a more modest way by the opposition leader Karamarko.
The main problem with the regulation of referendum in all the variations, 
we see in the constitutional provision that in all kinds of state referenda, the 
decision is made by a majority of those who had given their vote (Article 87/4 
62 Josipović: Pripremam promjenu Ustava, ali tek u idućem mandatu, Večernji list, July 12, 
2014, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/novi-ustav-ponudit-cu-gradanima-na-refe-
rendum-jer-su-moji-prijedlozi-vecini-stranaka-neprihvatljivi-950052 (30.03.2015).
63 Althought the issue has been introduced on a purely juristic level of “a principle of 
certainty of the referendum question” by Kostadinov, Biljana: Načelo jasnoće referen-
dumskog pitanja u Europi i u SAD-u, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 65, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 55 – 85. 
64 The President of the Republic using the civic initiative clearly reminds of a number 
of plebiscits which had been called in history by the great political leaders in several 
European countries.
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of the Constitution). This solution, included into the Constitution in 2010 on 
the grounds that in a situation where the correct number of voters is unknown 
no quorum can be prescribed, but actually in order to prevent any possible 
resistance to the accession to the EU, has transformed referenda into poten-
tially destructive instruments, dangerous for the viability of the democratic 
system.65 When a needed number of signatures has been collected, the result 
is more than certain. 
When it comes to constitutional reforms, in combination with the descri-
bed “candidate Josipović’s interpretation”, a clear and present danger to the 
maintenance of the power sharing system can be noticed. Such a development 
should be prevented as soon as possible by entering the requirement of a consi-
derable number of votes necessary to change the Constitution in a referendum.
65 Podolnjak, Robert; Smerdel, Branko (eds.): Referendum narodne inicijative u Hrvatskoj 
i Sloveniji: ustavnopravno uređenje, iskustva, perspektive, Hrvatska udruga za ustavno 
pravo, Zagreb, 2014.
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Sažetak
Branko Smerdel *
USTROJSTVO I DJELOVANJE “HIBRIDNOG PREDSJEDNIŠTVA” 
– OCJENA DJELOVANJA DIOBE VLASTI UNUTAR HRVATSKE 
IZVRŠNE VLASTI
Hrvatski sustav ustrojstva vlasti kakav je uveden ustavnim promjenama iz 
2000. godine, a posebno položaj predsjednika republike u tom sustavu, podvrgava se 
periodično vrlo oštrim kritikama, uglavnom s dvije polazne pozicije. Prvo, sa stajališta 
ustavnopravne teorije, kao “četvrt-predsjednički sustav”, za razliku od navodno postojećeg 
“čistog parlamentarizma”, te kao “hibridni model”, za razliku od “čistih” modela. 
Drugo, s praktičnog stajališta, kao nedjelotvoran sustav, koji ne određuje središte najviše 
vlasti, te tako pridonosi neželjenim sukobima. U tome bi imala biti razlika naspram 
“kancelarskog sustava”, koji predsjedniku države dodjeljuje samo reprezentativne funkcije, 
dok izvršnu vlast koncentrira u rukama predsjednika vlade. Prigovor je i to što je dioba 
vlasti primijenjena unutar dvaju državnih tijela koja obavljaju funkcije izvršne vlasti 
(egzekutive). Neposredan izbor predsjednika republike kritizira se kao skup i nepotreban 
te se predlaže da se izbor povjeri Saboru kao “nositelju najviše vlasti”.
Autor je sudjelovao u razradi modela i branio ga u različitim prilikama te sumira 
argumente njemu u prilog. Na teoriju o “čistom parlamentarizmu” odgovor je jednostavan: 
čisti modeli u životu ne postoje, inačice parlamentarizma bezbrojne su, od zemlje do 
zemlje. Dodatno, teorijsku “čistoću” teško bi bilo dovesti u vezu s djelotvornošću vlasti. 
Sa stajališta osiguranja održivog razvoja možemo ustvrditi upravo obratno: povijesno 
uspješni jedino su prikladno uređeni složeni modeli, prilagođeni potrebama konkretnih 
društava. Svrha kojoj dioba vlasti treba služiti nedvojbeno je uzajamno ograničavanje i 
nadzor svih nositelja vlasti, a posebno nositelja najviše vlasti, uz osiguravanje potrebne 
ravnoteže kako bi se očuvala djelotvornost. Na argument o mogućim sukobima odgovor 
je kako je najopasnije kad je sva vlast u rukama jednoga. Dioba vlasti, upravo obratno, 
navodi sudionike na razborito odlučivanje i kompromise. Kako je žarište vlasti egzekutiva, 
to je i locus gdje je treba primijeniti.
Polazi se od konstatacije kako tijekom triju mandata predsjednika republike izabranih 
u okvirima “hibridnog sustava”, na početku četvrtog mandata s novom predsjednicom, 
institucija nije institucionalizirana te njezino dalje funkcioniranje u nedopustivoj mjeri 
zavisi od osobnih preferencija trenutačnog nositelja dužnosti. S obzirom na to, autor 
* Dr. sc. Branko Smerdel, profesor Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Trg mar-
šala Tita 14, Zagreb; branko.smerdel@pravo.hr
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razlikuje tri tipa hrvatskog predsjedništva: imperijalno, tranzicijsko i samo-ograničavajuće. 
Autor u zaključku naglašava obvezu znanstvenika da stalno prate i propitkuju stvarno 
djelovanje tog ustavno zacrtanog sklopa institucija. Početak predsjedničkog mandata 
gospođe Grabar-Kitarović prilika je da pokušamo prosuditi perspektive njegova razvoja. 
Ključ je u okretanju strogom poštivanju Ustava i zakona, bez ustupaka stranačkim i 
drugim posebnim interesima. Bez toga sustav odijeljenih vlasti ne može služiti svrsi zbog 
koje je unesen u sve demokratske ustave: ograničavanje i odgovornost nositelja vlasti. 
Moguće je zaključiti kako sustav diobe vlasti neće moći u potpunosti zaživjeti sve dok 
se ne poduzme ozbiljan korak s ciljem primjene članka 6. Ustava Republike Hrvatske, 
koji obvezuje stranke na demokratsko ustrojstvo i djelovanje. Ali moguće je i obratno: da 
vodeće političke stranke potvrde svoju dominaciju i dokrajče taj iznimno vrijedan ustavni 
eksperiment.
Ključne riječi: Republika Hrvatska, predsjednik Republike, Ustav, čisti parlamentarni 
sustav, kriza, hibridno predsjedništvo
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